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The New Face of EU Security Policies? 
Analyzing the Normative Patterns of EU Non-Proliferation Policies in the 
Southern Mediterranean 
 
 
ABSTRACT In recent years, the European Union (EU) has substantially intensified its non-
proliferation policies in the southern Mediterranean. Although the analysis of these policies 
shows that the Union comes close to what the literature suggests is an ideal type normative 
power, this interpretation in itself is at odds with other security policies in the southern 
Mediterranean and with non-proliferation policies outside the region, most notably in Iran. 
Therefore, this article examines the causes and implications of this inconsistency, and argues 
that it can be problematic to characterise the EU as a normative power in a geographically 
and thematically limited issue area. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Exactly 15 years passed between the adoption of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration and the 
decision to organise, for the very first time, a formal conference on one of the Declaration’s 
key security provisions, namely a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). Although the decision was taken by consensus at the 2010 review conference of the 
key treaty in the field, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, holding such 
a conference has proven to be difficult.1 Given the apparently slow progress in this area, 
analyses of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) tended in the initial instance to 
criticise the lack of EU action in support of WMD non-proliferation in the southern 
Mediterranean area (see Biscop, 2003: 188).2 Even with the development of the so-called 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) on the eve of the 2004 EU enlargement, a policy 
which was regarded as targeting security issues in the EU’s periphery more specifically, 
pundits’ assessments have hardly changed (Dokos, 2008: 127). Likewise, the launch of the 
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008 has not brought about a stronger non-
proliferation dimension in Euro-Mediterranean relations. 
However, developments in EU non-proliferation policies in the southern Mediterranean in 
recent years suggest that a new appraisal of the situation would be both timely and beneficial 
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to the field. As will be argued in this article, the EU has substantially intensified its non-
proliferation activities in the region in the last ten years, in particular in those areas not 
covered by the formal geographical policy frameworks of the EMP, ENP and UfM. The final 
breakthrough came with the new Instrument for Stability (2007-2012), a financial tool to 
finance, inter alia, long-term projects that address transregional and global threats. At first 
glance, this development is hardly surprising, since it appears to reflect what has been 
referred to as a ‘“securitization” dynamic’ in Euro-Mediterranean relations (Kausch & 
Youngs, 2009: 968), whereby Mediterranean policies are increasingly driven by threat 
perceptions in the European Union. However, a closer examination of EU non-proliferation 
policies in the southern Mediterranean reveals major differences in other security areas such 
as counter-terrorism. Therefore, the question remains as to which kind of security actor the 
EU is in the field of non-proliferation. 
In this article, it will be argued that the EU closely approximates what has recently been 
termed the ideal type of normative power (De Zutter, 2010; Forsberg, 2011). In other words, 
whereas the EU’s policies in fields such as counter-terrorism or migration would seem to 
encourage us to question ‘the degree to which it really wishes to act as a normative power’ 
(Joffé, 2008: 168), EU non-proliferation policies in the southern Mediterranean do appear to 
reinforce the normative power perspective of the EU. However, this raises broader questions 
about the causes and implications of the inconsistency between the EU’s normative approach 
to non-proliferation and other security policies in the southern Mediterranean and beyond. 
More specifically, this undermines the conceptual utility of the emerging ideal type approach 
to normative power Europe (NPE), in particular in geographically and thematically limited 
issue areas such as non-proliferation of WMD in the southern Mediterranean. 
Based on a brief conceptual framework on NPE as an ideal type, the main part of this article 
will examine in detail the normative patterns of EU non-proliferation policies in the southern 
Mediterranean in the last ten years. This will be followed by a critical analysis of the results 
and their implications. Finally, more general conclusions will be drawn about NPE and the 
EU as a security actor. 
 
 
Conceptual Operationalisation: Normative Power Europe as an Ideal Type 
 
In the early years of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, EU policies towards its southern 
partners were regarded as different from the realpolitik of the traditional foreign policies of 
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nation states. As Kausch and Youngs (2009: 963) suggest, ‘The EMP was predicated on joint 
commitments to cooperative security, region-building, burden-sharing, cultural proximity, 
economic support and political modernization’. This perceived distinctiveness of Euro-
Mediterranean relations has attracted a large body of literature, particularly examining the 
extent to which the EU was actually acting as a normative power in the region, by diffusing 
shared norms of good governance, economic development and comprehensive security in a 
cooperative way. In contrast to expectations, the large majority of analyses actually conclude 
that the EU’s policies in the region can hardly be characterised as a normative power 
approach (see Bicchi, 2006; Pace et al., 2009). In the specific sphere of political and security 
issues, it has been lamented that, in practice, the ‘comprehensive and cooperative approach’ 
to security (Biscop, 2003: 184-6) has been narrowed down to what has been called a 
‘“surveillance and control” approach to security’ (Pace, 2010: 432). According to this 
approach, policies are largely informed by real or perceived EU-centred security concerns, 
above all Islamist terrorism and migration from the southern Mediterranean to Europe. 
Furthermore, they dominate Euro-Mediterranean relations to the detriment of a more 
cooperative approach based on a broader normative agenda (see, for example, Joffé, 2008; 
Kausch & Youngs, 2009; Pace, 2010; Wolff, 2009). 
It is surprising, however, that one of the dominant issues of the global security agenda in the 
last decade has been neglected in these analyses: the proliferation of WMD. Yet, given the 
widespread criticism of the EU’s security approach in the Euro-Mediterranean area, the 
examination of EU policies in this particular field could offer new insights into the extent to 
which the EU acts as a normative power in the region. The initial problem associated with 
such an analysis is the lack of conceptual precision regarding the NPE concept, which has 
provoked a lively debate about its strengths and weaknesses during the last ten years (see 
Forsberg, 2011: 1186-90). Scholars have actually disagreed about the most fundamental 
elements of the concept: is it a prescriptive or descriptive concept? Which norms does a 
normative power diffuse? Which means does it use? In recent years, the literature on NPE as 
an ideal type has offered useful answers. According to this approach, NPE is neither a 
normative description of the EU as it is nor an ideal to be followed by the EU, but an 
analytical ideal type in a Weberian sense (Forsberg, 2011; De Zutter, 2010). For the purposes 
of this article, the criteria for such an ideal-type normative power can be streamlined into two 
groups: (1) the normative basis and (2) normative practice of NPE. In a sense, this refers to 
what NPE is and what it does. Together with the potential impact of normative power, this 
categorisation largely resembles Manner’s ‘tripartite analytical methods’ based on the 
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analysis of the ‘EU’s principles, actions and impact’ (Manners, 2008: 55; see Whitman, 
2011). 
The first group of criteria refers to the EU’s normative identity and interests (see Forsberg, 
2011: 1192-3). Although both concepts are debatable, they help to define more precisely 
what is meant by an ideal type normative power. The first concept states that certain norms 
and rules constitute a normative power, e.g. the treaty-based legal order in the case of the EU. 
The latter concept, normative interests, refers to the generally accepted distinction between a 
normative power’s broader inclusionist interests aimed at ‘achieving mutually beneficial 
goals’ in third countries (Pace, 2010: 433) and the more instrumental and exclusionist 
interests of other types of powers. This distinction echoes growing ethical considerations 
about what is ‘doing good’ in European foreign policy, especially in the context of ethical 
power Europe. Although the concept of ethical power is still not as well developed as the 
NPE concept and focuses primarily on the intention and purpose behind EU actions (see 
Aggestam, 2008: 3-4), bringing in an ethical dimension is an important contribution to the 
understanding of normative power Europe as an ideal type (see De Zutter, 2010). 
The second group of criteria of an ideal type normative power includes the actual practice of 
norm diffusion. In this respect, the preliminary criterion is that the normative power itself 
behaves according to certain norms and rules that have been constructed as being universal 
and, thus, ethically ‘good’. These include, for example, international law or principles of 
multilateralism (see Forsberg, 2011: 1193-4). In the realm of WMD, i.e. nuclear, chemical or 
biological weapons, these norms and rules broadly prohibit, and with variations according to 
weapon type, the proliferation of these weapons or of weapon-related technologies, whilst 
foreseeing complete disarmament. At the same time, they permit the development and use of 
civilian nuclear, chemical and biological technologies under international controls, including 
controls for related exports. Crucially, a normative power uses what Forsberg (2011: 1194) 
calls ‘normative means of power’ to diffuse such norms and rules. Although De Zutter (2010: 
1114) has well noted that ‘[i]nstruments do not define a normative power’, most studies of 
NPE come conceptually closer to her ‘ethical ideal-type of cosmopolitan normative power’, 
wherein non-confrontational and non-coercive instruments do play a defining role due to 
ethical considerations. If we return to Forsberg’s study, these instruments or mechanisms 
which are typical of a normative power can be defined as follows: ‘persuading others’ in 
political dialogues; ‘invoking norms’ that have been agreed to by two parties in common 
agreements; ‘shaping the discourse of what is normal’; and leading by ‘the power of 
example’ (Forsberg, 2011: 1196-8). In this regard, normative power is more specifically 
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concerned with mechanisms of norm diffusion, i.e. this article’s empirical focus, than the 
broader, though interrelated concept of civilian power, which ‘strive[s] to “civilize” (...) 
relations between states along the lines of their own, democratic, domestic politics’ (Maull, 
2005: 779-80). 
A separate question would explore whether the use of these mechanisms of norm diffusion 
also ‘achieves normative ends’ (Forsberg, 2011: 1194). At a minimum, this means that ‘the 
EU should “do least harm” in world politics’ (Manners, 2008: 59). In terms of effectiveness, 
however, this criterion is rather limited. It may be much more illuminating to examine how 
far the EU achieves tangible results when it comes to the measurable acceptance of norms by 
third parties. The key problem here is that the diffusion of norms tends to be a long-term 
process. Therefore, it is difficult to trace real impact in the initial phases of policy framing 
and implementation, as for instance in the case of the EU non-proliferation policies in the 
southern Mediterranean. In other words, the actual effectiveness of normative power Europe 
cannot yet be discerned in this case. In the short term, it is more practical, and ultimately 
more fruitful, to begin by analysing the normative basis and practice of the EU and then to 
offer a critical interpretation of the implications of these results by considering them 
alongside broader perspectives. 
 
 
The Normative Basis of EU Non-Proliferation Policies 
 
As has been suggested already, it is notoriously difficult to pin down an actor’s ‘normative 
identity’. Nonetheless, the systematic examination of relevant documents reveals that the 
EU’s policies are firmly based upon the international non-proliferation rules and norms 
established in multilateral agreements. According to Council Common Position 
2003/805/CFSP the major agreements, which are also relevant for the southern 
Mediterranean, include: the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; the Chemical 
Weapons Convention; the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; the Hague Code of 
Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and the 
Additional Safeguard Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency which permits 
inspectors to undertake intrusive inspections of nuclear installations (see Santoro, 2011). 
Crucially, the EU’s key documents in the field, in particular the 2003 WMD Strategy and the 
2008 New Lines of Action which updated the former, demonstrate that these international 
treaties and institutions form the centrepiece of the EU’s policies. According to the WMD 
6 
 
Strategy, ‘The EU is committed to the multilateral treaty system, which provides the legal 
and normative basis for all non-proliferation efforts’ (Council of the European Union, 2003: 
6). This commitment to multilateralism and non-proliferation norms and rules in the form of 
treaties and institutions parallels similar commitments in the strategic documents of the EU’s 
Mediterranean policies, from the Barcelona Declaration to the final declaration of the 2008 
UfM ministerial conference. In fact, the adherence of all Mediterranean partner countries to 
the existing non-proliferation agreements can been seen, together with the establishment of a 
WMD-free zone in the Middle East, as the two overarching objectives of the EU’s non-
proliferation policy in the region. Furthermore, concrete policy measures in the form of 
Council Decisions or, prior to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, Joint Actions, clearly reflect this 
normative identity based on international non-proliferation norms and institutions. To 
illustrate this, we need only consider that of the 27 Joint Actions and Council Decisions 
adopted to date in the field of non-proliferation, 22 address specifically multilateral non-
proliferation institutions. These usually involve the financing of specific measures to increase 
the membership in these institutions or to strengthen the institutions’ control mechanisms (see 
Council, 2012). As the most recent Council Decision on non-proliferation measures in the 
Middle East makes clear: ‘In the Union’s view, practical steps should, inter alia, promote 
universal adherence to, and compliance with, all multilateral agreements and instruments in 
the field of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament’ (Council of the European 
Union, 2012: 70). In short, it seems reasonable to argue that the EU has a normative identity 
based on multilateralism and international norms and rules in the field of non-proliferation. 
However, the analysis of strategic documents is inconclusive concerning the question if the 
EU pursues inclusionist or exclusionist interests. The WMD Strategy states, for instance, that 
‘Proliferation of WMD is a global threat, which requires a global approach. However, as 
security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean, we should 
pay particular attention to the issue of proliferation in the Mediterranean area’ (Council of the 
European Union, 2003: 7). The New Lines of Actions are even more outspoken when they 
stipulate that ‘We must accord the highest priority to protecting European citizens and our 
friends and allies against the existing and growing risk presented by the proliferation of such 
weapons’ (Council of the European Union, 2008: 3). However, these rhetorical 
manifestations may not necessarily represent the dominant type of interest that guides the 
EU’s non-proliferation policies. Therefore, the rhetoric should be compared with the patterns 
of EU non-proliferation policies. In other words, if EU policies are informed by narrower 
instrumental interests which are exclusively concerned with the EU’s own security and 
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stability, and not by more inclusionist interests that are pursued in accordance with the 
security concerns of third parties, the policies should be strongest where the EU’s 
instrumental interests are most affected. 
In order to examine this claim, it is necessary first to outline the EU’s potential security 
concerns in the southern Mediterranean. Classical military threat assessments take into 
consideration both the WMD capabilities of actors as well as their actual intent to use them 
against Europe.3 Such an assessment based on open sources is not immediately worrisome: 
‘The proliferation threat against European countries should be conceived of as a mid- to long-
term threat’ (Dokos, 2008: 92; see Dokos, 2008: 73-89). Nevertheless, three areas of security 
concern remain: first, the existing WMD arsenals could be used against European forces 
deployed in the region. Second, WMD and dual-use capabilities,4 even without the direct 
intention of using them, represents a major destabilizing risk, from the accidental use of 
WMD, e.g. in crisis situations, to the transfer of WMD related knowledge to terrorist 
organisations operating in Europe. Third, the failure to ratify key treaties in the field of non-
proliferation weakens control over the development of WMD and undermines the fragile 
stability in the EU’s neighbourhood. Accordingly, the southern Mediterranean countries can 
be divided into three groups of concern: (a) states of high concern that are believed to possess 
WMD and that have ratified only a very few major non-proliferation agreements; (b) states of 
medium concern that have ratified few treaties and/or have dual-use capabilities; and (c) 
states of low concern that do not possess any relevant capabilities and that have ratified 
almost all relevant agreements. 
The countries of the heartland of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Egypt, Israel and Syria, 
undoubtedly belong to group (a). Israel is by far the most capable of all southern 
Mediterranean countries, in particular due its supposed nuclear arsenal of up to 200 
warheads. The other two regional actors, Egypt and, in particular, Syria have substantial, yet 
unspecified capabilities in the area of chemical weapons. In fact, at the time of writing during 
the current uprising in Syria, the security and safety of the Syrian chemical weapons arsenal 
is a major source of concern in the region. In the turmoil of war, for example, these weapons 
could be launched accidentally or end up in the hands of terrorist organisations. Apart from 
their WMD capabilities, Egypt, Israel and Syria have also a very low degree of integration in 
the international non-proliferation institutions. Egypt and Syria are non-nuclear-weapon state 
members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but otherwise none of 
the major non-proliferation treaties have been ratified. Israel, for its part, has ratified none of 
these treaties. Group (b) consists of Algeria, Lebanon and Libya. Algeria is currently 
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developing a nuclear energy programme and is believed to be engaged in low-key 
biotechnology research. It has still not ratified, nor has Lebanon, all relevant agreements. 
Libya is a special case. In the past, Libya had been a major proliferation concern, but in 2003 
the regime in Tripoli announced the dismantlement of all its WMD activities and joined all 
relevant non-proliferation agreements. At that time, however, the EU non-proliferation policy 
was still in its fledgling stages and played, at best, an indirect role (see Bowen, 2006: 47-69). 
During the uprising against Qadhafi, concerns emerged again regarding the still existant 
chemical weapons in Libya, but to a large extent they turned out to be unfounded and the few 
weapons that were left after Qadhafi’s fall were quickly put under the control of the 
responsible international organisation, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (see Zanders, 2011). Finally, group (c) comprises Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. 
Despite growing interest in nuclear energy in the wake of the nuclear renaissance in the 
region, especially in Jordan, these countries have no significant WMD-related activities 
ongoing and are member states in good standing of virtually all relevant non-proliferation 
agreements. 
However, in contrast to what narrow instrumental security interests would suggest, the EU 
non-proliferation policies in the southern Mediterranean have not focused on countries of 
high concern, either rhetorically or in practice. On the contrary, the geographical priority has 
been the countries of least or medium concern: Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and, to a lesser, 
extent Jordan and Lebanon. Although all countries in the southern Mediterranean have been 
the object of at least a few EU non-proliferation actions, as can be seen in Table 1, only the 
latter two have received substantial support in terms of export control assistance. This has 
come in the form of projects in the framework of Joint Actions in the field of non-
proliferation or as part of the network of Centres of Excellence that have been set up in 
various countries to mitigate chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks. 
Moreover, during the uprising against Qadhafi in Libya and the current revolt against Assad 
in Syria, the EU has not been in involved in the efforts to secure, if necessary by military 
means, the chemical weapons in these countries, even though these have probably been the 
most pressing WMD concerns in the southern Mediterranean. This shows how, in practice, 
instrumental security interests have been largely absent from the EU’s non-proliferation 
policies in the southern Mediterranean. The EU rather focuses on non-confrontational 
activities in countries of medium and low concern. 
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Normative Practice and EU Non-Proliferation Policies 
 
The EU’s normative identity and interests are matched by the EU’s own actions accordingly. 
Most notably, all EU member states have ratified or are members of all major non-
proliferation organisations and agreements (see Kienzle & Vestergaard, 2012: 375). 
Furthermore, the EU has taken numerous measures to increase the membership of these 
organisations and treaties and to strengthen the enforcement of their norms and rules (see 
Council, 2012). At the same time, the EU and its member states have incorporated 
internationally established norms and regulations into their own legislation, for example 
concerning the control of the export of relevant items and technologies. Finally, and 
decisively for the EU’s non-proliferation policies in the southern Mediterranean, the Union 
has made exclusive use of almost all existing normative mechanisms in its non-proliferation 
policies.5 The exception to this is that the leading by ‘the power of example’ approach has 
remained a largely academic exercise, as is evidenced by the example of the European 
Atomic Energy Community Treaty inspiring ideas of similar arrangements in the Middle East 
(see Mallard, 2008). 
 
Political Dialogue 
The first normative mechanisms that the EU has implemented are different forms of political 
dialogue. In this regard, it is necessary to distinguish between one-way communications of 
the EU to Mediterranean third countries; bilateral dialogues between the EU and a single 
Mediterranean third country; and Euro-Mediterranean multilateral dialogues. One-way 
communication, which usually takes the form of a Demarche or a Declaration on behalf of 
the EU and urges or supports the accession to international non-proliferation regimes 
respectively, has been used in the case of all Mediterranean third countries. In the case of 
bilateral dialogues, non-proliferation issues such as non-proliferation institutions, expert 
controls and multilateral nuclear fuel arrangements have been discussed in both specific 
political dialogue forums, most notably with Egypt and Israel, and in the framework of the 
Association Committees of the ENP, in particular with the more advanced Mediterranean 
partner countries, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel and Jordan. Multilateral dialogues on non-
proliferation issues, for their part, have been on hold, at least within the framework of regular 
meetings of senior officials of the EMP. Nevertheless, outside the framework of Euro-
Mediterranean relations, the EU has been able to finance numerous workshops and seminars 
run by international governmental and intergovernmental organisations, in which government 
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officials and members of civil society from southern Mediterranean partner countries 
participated. The workshops have largely been financed through Council Decisions or, prior 
to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, Joint Actions, and have aimed at diverse issues such as 
implementing export controls to prevent the illicit export of WMD-related items or the 
ratification of relevant agreements. 
From a regional perspective, the key measures have been conferences and workshops that 
have focused specifically on the region of the southern Mediterranean. Such conferences 
have been held on the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention and United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1540, which obliges all 
UN members to take appropriate measures to prevent WMD proliferation whilst encouraging 
them to ratify the relevant agreements. After years of lobbying partner countries, the EU has 
also been able to convene a series of three seminars on broader issues relating to non-
proliferation and disarmament in the Middle East. The first one was an informal seminar held 
in Paris in 2008. The next event, held in Brussels in 2011, was more formal and was of 
particular significance since it involved the active participation of partner countries in the 
southern Mediterranean and the Middle East, including both Israel and Iran (see Müller, 
2011: 21-3). The main objective of this event was to foster open discussions about the 
establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East as part of the previously mentioned 
decision in 2010 to hold a formal conference on that topic amongst the states of the region. A 
similar track-2 event took place under Council Decision 2012/422/CFSP in November 2012 
and was flanked by a series of background papers and a dedicated website. In recent years, 
these regional conferences and seminars have been complemented by the establishment of 
networks of relevant professionals from all southern Mediterranean partner countries, in 
particular EpiSouth, which operates in the area of bio-safety and bio-security, and Euromed 
Police II and III, which operate in the area of law enforcement (see Table 1). The added value 
of these regional initiatives has been that they have consistently kept open the communication 
channels on non-proliferation and disarmament between southern Mediterranean countries. 
These are in line with a persuasion based approach, which emphasises principled debates and 
the power of the argument. This is certainly an important achievement in a region where 
security related debates are especially difficult to sustain (see Heller, 2000: 166). 
 
The Non-Proliferation Clause 
The second group of mechanisms are mainly concerned with the inclusion of non-
proliferation provisions in agreements with southern Mediterranean countries. These 
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provisions can, in basic terms, be ‘invoked by one party when they are violated by another’ 
(Forsberg, 2011: 1197). The EU’s non-proliferation provisions are based on a specific clause, 
applicable since 2003, which it is stipulated must be included in the EU’s mixed agreements 
with third countries. The clause itself consists of two parts: the first is an essential component 
which refers back to existing obligations under international agreements and is binding for 
the contracting parties; the other is a largely declaratory element, which promotes the 
ratification of non-proliferation agreements in general (see Grip, 2009). So far, all ENP 
Action Plans that have been signed with individual partner countries and form the backbone 
of the EU’s neighbourhood policy include substantial provisions on non-proliferation that, to 
a certain extent, represent the specific non-proliferation clause (see Table 1). Although they 
vary slightly from country to country, especially in the case of Israel, and to a lesser extent 
Egypt,6 the plans include broad commitments, which include the following: an agreement to 
comply with, or to accede to, existing international agreements; to cooperate in the area of 
export control and security border management in order to prevent illicit trade in WMD-
related goods; and to promote the non-proliferation agenda of the Barcelona Declaration. 
Although it would be easy to criticise these non-proliferation provisions as watered down 
versions of the non-proliferation clause, the fact that the EU has managed to include such 
provisions into documents that do not legally require them is a major accomplishment, 
especially given the historical and geographical context of the Middle East. Furthermore, they 
underline the EU’s non-coercive approach in general. 
The non-proliferation provision that has received most attention from analysts is the non-
proliferation clause that was included in the 2004 EU-Syria Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreement, despite the fact that this agreement has still not entered into force.7 First of all, 
the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement with Syria, together with the Association 
Agreement with Libya, which is still to be negotiated, is the only Euro-Mediterranean 
agreement that must include the full non-proliferation clause, since all other mixed 
agreements with Euro-Mediterranean third countries were signed and ratified before the entry 
into force of the clause.8 Second, Syria is a major proliferation concern in the Middle East, as 
has already been suggested. However, the inclusion of the non-proliferation clause in the 
negotiation with Syria initially caused a serious debate amongst those who favoured a hard-
line approach that would force Syria to accept both parts of the clause as essential elements 
and those who feared that the negotiation of a non-proliferation clause at a relatively late 
stage would place the whole Association Agreement in danger (see Elleman et al., 2012: 15-
6; Grip, 2009: 7). Ultimately, the EU agreed (with only minor modifications) upon the 
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minimum interpretation of the non-proliferation clause, wherein the first part remains 
essential and the second one non-essential. In this way, the EU maintained its normative 
commitment to international non-proliferation treaties and organisations, though without a 
dominant coercive element. 
 
From Outreach Projects to the Centres of Excellence 
The EU’s outreach and support activities, which constitute the third group of mechanisms, 
have become a key element of the EU’s non-proliferation policies in the southern 
Mediterranean. The oldest projects, stemming from a 2005 Pilot Project in this area, are 
carried out by the German Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA) in co-
ordination with the European Commission and, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
in 2009, the European External Action Service. In total, the BAFA has executed three 
projects, the 2005 Pilot Project and the 2008 and 2011 Long-Term Projects, with a total 
budget of more than €11m.9 Generally, these projects aim at improving the controls, 
particularly of dual-use items, in third countries. The projects essentially have two main 
purposes: on the one hand, third countries potentially get better access to trade in high 
technology sectors, which is a major incentive for many of them, and, on the other hand, the 
security risk of the diversion of dual-use items and technologies for illegitimate goals is 
lowered. In a sense, the EU offers third countries the opportunity to exploit its own, 
internationally established legal and normative framework in the field of dual-use items and 
technologies in exchange for easier access to sensitive high technologies. Since outreach 
activities depend both upon existing contractual relationships with partner countries and on 
political willingness to accept the EU’s outreach offers, the activities have been limited to a 
few advanced southern Mediterranean countries of low proliferation concern, in particular 
Morocco and Tunisia. 
The implementation of the projects has not been free of problems. In the case of Tunisia, for 
example, personnel changes during the Arab Spring led, for a limited period, to the break-up 
of the relationship with Tunisia. This resulted in the loss of institutional memory in the sense 
of collective knowledge acquired during previous outreach activities by the Tunisian 
administration. In the case of Morocco, this was not an issue, but in the early stages of the 
outreach activities in this country, the unclear relationship between BAFA’s projects and 
similar outreach projects by the US government programme EXBS lead to confusion 
regarding the exact distribution of tasks. This problem was solved, however, through an 
agreement between BAFA, EXBS and the Moroccan authorities. Finally, it should be pointed 
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out the BAFA projects have lacked a marked regional dimension in the southern 
Mediterranean. Nevertheless, from the perspective of normative power, the BAFA outreach 
projects have consistently remained a cooperative norm export exercise in line with 
international standards established, for example, in UN Security Council Resolution 1540. 
Furthermore, they have been by and large technical projects. As such, they did not prop up 
dictatorial regimes in the southern Mediterranean before the Arab Spring, as other security 
related EU policies arguably did. 
At the same time as the BAFA projects, the EU implemented other, though not directly 
linked, outreach activities in the form of Joint Actions and Council Decisions in support of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Preparatory Commission of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization. These included, in particular, Joint 
Action 2005/574/CFSP, 2006/418/CFSP, 2008/314/CFSP and 2008/588/CFSP as well as 
Council Decision 2010/585/CFSP (see Table 1). These Joint Actions had a substantial overall 
budget of more than €30m and funded different, highly technical and generally non-intrusive 
projects such as the ‘Strengthening of States’ Capabilities for Detection and Response to 
Illicit Trafficking’ or ‘Legislative and Regulatory Assistance’. All Mediterranean countries of 
low and medium concern participate in at least one of these projects. With the development 
of the new Instrument for Stability in 2007, the EU intensified its outreach and support 
activities with cooperative projects worth more than €8m. These projects included, for 
example, those aimed at combating the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive elements 
as well as the development of knowledge management systems on CBRN trafficking and on 
risk mitigation. It is important to note that the EU does not implement these projects directly 
in the southern Mediterranean but works through its Joint Research Centre or the United 
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. 
Based upon the Instrument for Stability projects, the EU intensified its outreach with the 
establishment of a network of so-called CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence with 
the aim of implementing ‘a coordinated strategy for CBRN risk mitigation at international, 
regional and national levels’ (European Union, 2012). Despite the network’s slow start and 
initial difficulties, it has slowly been taking shape. So far, five southern Mediterranean 
countries participate in this €21m Euros initiative,10 namely Lebanon, Tunisia, Algeria, 
Morocco and Jordan. The latter three will also host small regional secretariats of 
approximately four people plus visiting staff from EU institutions and member states. At the 
end of 2011, and in early 2012, the network also published its first calls for roughly 30 
projects, of which 9 were at least partially focused on Mediterranean countries. These deal 
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with different CBRN risk mitigation mechanisms such as knowledge development and best 
practice transfer; capacity building for first responders in CBRN incidents; the development 
of an integrated national nuclear security system; and national response planning for CBRN 
events. Thus, similar to the BAFA programmes, the Centres of Excellence initiative is 
ultimately about the transfer of CBRN related rules and norms to partner countries. Once 
more, it is being carried out by an international organisation, in this case the United Nations 
Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, in co-operation with the EU, which 
underlines the cooperative and international nature of these projects. At the same time, the 
initiative stresses the local ownership at the regional level of its activities, though it is still not 
entirely clear how this will work out in practice. Nonetheless, its main characteristic is a 
comprehensive, long-term perspective aimed at an ‘iterative process to build a culture of 
safety and security’ (European Commission, 2012: 3). 
 
 
A Different Security Policy: Causes and Consequences 
 
Given the EU’s strong normative basis and extensive normative practice in matters of non-
proliferation in the southern Mediterranean, it is possible to conclude that the EU actually 
comes fairly close to the ideal type of a normative power. However, this research conclusion 
is at odds with the EU’s characterisation in other areas: first, in other areas closely related to 
non-proliferation, e.g. counter-terrorism, the existing literature suggests that the EU does not 
fulfil the established criteria of a normative power in the southern Mediterranean, as was 
pointed out during the conceptual analysis above. Second, by looking beyond the confines of 
the non-proliferation policies in the southern Mediterranean, it is possible to see that in other 
geographic areas the EU still falls short of the ideal type of normative power. This difference 
has been most pronounced in the case of the EU Iran policy, wherein the pursuit of normative 
interests and the use of normative mechanisms have declined rapidly. Although originally the 
EU’s Iran policy may have been close to the ideal type of a normative power, it has 
increasingly turned towards coercive measures driven by more instrumental security interests 
and has, thus, departed from its role as a normative power during the nuclear negotiations of 
2003 (see Kienzle, 2012). Consequently, the question is: what are the causes, and 
consequences, of this inconsistency in the EU’s characterisation as a normative power? 
At first glance, the similarities between different non-proliferation policies and between these 
policies and other security policies are striking. First, the EU’s globally-oriented normative 
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agenda in the field of non-proliferation does not change across regions. Likewise, as in the 
case of non-proliferation, the EU’s normative agendas in security areas like migration or 
counter-terrorism are based upon the corresponding international normative frameworks. 
Second, the formal prioritisation of non-proliferation hardly varies from the priority given to 
other security policies. That is, counter-terrorism or migration policies per se are not more 
important for the EU than non-proliferation policies. Third, the type or the intensity of the 
EU’s relationship with the region or individual countries does not correlate with the variation 
in policy output. For example, EU non-proliferation policies towards Israel and Egypt, in 
many respects two very distinct countries, hardly varies, whereas policies towards Syria and 
Iran, two major proliferation concerns, have been very different. Yet, despite these 
similarities, the differences between non-proliferation policies in the southern Mediterranean 
and Iran suggest that there should be special regional factors to explain these differences, 
whereas the variation between distinct EU security policy fields in the same geographic space 
hints at the peculiar conditions of non-proliferation policies inside the Union. 
With regards to regional factors, the dominant issue has been the intractable Arab-Israeli 
conflict. In other security fields, this conflict has already been identified as a dominant factor 
in Euro-Mediterranean relations (Biscop, 2003: 188). In terms of non-proliferation, the main 
problem is that ‘...the parties of the EMP are in deep disagreement over virtually all the issues 
involved’, as an Egyptian analyst pointed out several years ago (El-Sayed Selim, 2000: 134). 
Therefore, any relevant policy initiative has to circumvent the disagreements that exist 
carefully, especially when it comes to Egypt and Israel. This is first and foremost because of 
reasons of strategic balance: whereas Egypt claims that Israel’s nuclear arsenal leads to a 
strategic disequilibrium in the region, Israel points to conventional Arab superiority. Second, 
whereas Arab states see Israeli nuclear disarmament as a pre-condition for peace, Israel 
maintains, with the support of the United States, that it cannot disarm without a 
comprehensive peace agreement. Due to the first disagreement, one-sided non-proliferation 
measures, i.e. which do not include Israeli disarmament, would essentially reinforce the 
strategic disequilibrium and are, thus, problematic for Egypt and other Arab states. Yet, due 
to the continuing conflict, disarmament measures in Israel are highly unlikely to succeed. 
Consequently, the most likely policy output consists of the measures that have been actually 
implemented, namely political dialogue and the invocation of international norms and 
confidence-building through outreach projects. In the case of Iran, the constraints of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict do not apply in the same way, because the development of Iran’s nuclear 
programme is not only worrisome from an Israeli perspective but also from the perspective of 
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Iran’s Arab rivals in the region, not least Egypt. Thus, the options to act in Iran have been 
much broader than in the southern Mediterranean. Likewise, counter-terrorism and migration 
policies are not affected in the same fundamental way by the Arab-Israeli conflict as the non-
proliferation policies. 
Within the EU, the most striking difference between the non-proliferation policies in the 
southern Mediterranean and other policy areas is the role of what Bicchi (2007: 28-34) calls 
‘policy entrepreneurs’. In the case of Iran, the three major EU member states, France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom, the so-called E3, took the initiative in 2003 and sent 
representatives for the first time to Iran to negotiate with the regime in Tehran. Although the 
EU was involved in the E3 format almost from the beginning through the inclusion of the 
High Representative in the negotiation team and consultations in the Council, it is the 
growing consensus amongst the small E3 grouping that has actively shaped the EU’s Iran 
policy (see Kienzle, forthcoming). Likewise, it was specific EU member states that pushed 
the Union’s Mediterranean agenda away from a more normative approach in security areas 
related to non-proliferation. Thus, the southern European member states were the driving 
force behind migration policies (Lutterbeck, 2006), whereas the EU’s former North African 
colonial powers were the dominant actors in counter-terrorism policies (Wolff, 2009). With 
regards to non-proliferation policies in the southern Mediterranean, no similarly influential 
actor has taken the initiative of implementing non-normative measures. This may be the 
result of disagreement, as in the case of the previously mentioned coercive elements in the 
non-proliferation clause in the Association Agreement with Syria. But it may also be 
explained simply by the absence of any actor that may try to force, for instance, the EU to 
engage in military involvement in the Syrian civil war. In practice, the EU’s non-proliferation 
policies in the southern Mediterranean have been driven by the non-proliferation units in the 
European Commission and Council and, since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 
2009, the European External Action Service. Naturally, these institutions have focused their 
activity on the instruments that they know best. These have typically taken the form of 
political dialogue, non-proliferation clauses, and the financing of outreach programmes by 
multilateral organisations. In short, there has been no policy entrepreneur who wanted to push 
for non-proliferation measures distinct from such normative instruments. 
In sum, what are the implications that arise from this analysis? First, it should be noted that 
the inconsistent normative and non-normative approaches to security issues in the southern 
Mediterranean and beyond tarnish the image of the EU as a normative power. As a result, it is 
very unlikely that the EU will be able to construct its new non-proliferation policies in the 
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region using the image of a normative power in a way that is fully accepted by southern 
Mediterranean partner countries. More importantly, however, this exposes the EU’s non-
proliferation policy in the southern Mediterranean to the criticism of being a weak policy. 
Policy-oriented analyses of the EU in particular tend to dismiss the Union’s normative power 
approach as a fail-safe option. This option is regarded as effectual when those arguably more 
‘forceful’ policies, like the Iranian one, are not feasible without having to overcome major 
political obstacles. Although this misses the point that advocates of normative power would 
like to make, NPE may still become a synonym for a weak power in the eyes of other actors 
if they see that the EU is a different, and in their eyes more forceful, actor in other areas. For 
countries like Syria or Israel the irrelevance of the EU in security matters is already well-
documented (see Elleman et al., 2012; Harpaz & Shamis, 2010). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
By systematically taking stock of the growing EU non-proliferation policies in the southern 
Mediterranean, it has been argued that the way that the Union implements its policies actually 
brings it very close to the criteria of an ideal type of a normative power. However, the 
broader picture of EU security policies reveals that there are substantial inconsistencies in the 
different issues relating to the southern Mediterranean as well as in the EU non-proliferation 
policies beyond that region. At first glance, this would seem to confirm earlier research 
results that have shown that the EU is only a normative power when it comes to certain issues 
(see Lerch & Schwellnus, 2006). However, it is not clear how narrow such an issue area can 
be in order to continue to recognise the EU as a normative power. In other words, is it useful 
to describe the EU as a normative power in one very specific area if in other, closely related 
areas it is clearly not? There are inherent dangers in viewing or constructing the EU as a 
normative power in a thematically and geographically limited space. In a nutshell, the 
inconsistencies in the EU’s policies undermine the acceptance of the EU as a normative 
power by other actors and opens the door to criticism of the EU’s normative approach as a 
mere default policy due to its perceived weakness. 
In order to avoid these pitfalls of the NPE concept, the literature on how to identify a 
normative power, be it using the ideal type approach or Manner’s tripartite methodology, 
should avoid turning the question into a mere tick-boxing exercise, wherein the EU simply 
fulfils, or fails to fulfil, certain criteria. There is rather a need to analyse the EU critically as a 
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normative power from a broader perspective, which would include different geographic 
spaces such as the eastern neighbourhood or south-east Asia. More specifically, research on 
the NPE concept requires more substantial comparative analyses, wherein the actual causes 
for the inconsistencies between both different issues, and different geographic areas, are 
examined in-depth. In this respect, the ultimate test case will be the long-term impact of the 
EU’s normative approach, especially the evolving normative practices in targeted third 
countries. By dealing with these issues, the NPE literature could make significant 
contributions to the broader literature on the EU as an international actor. 
From a policy point of view, there are essentially two ways forward: on the one hand, the EU 
can attempt to construct a more comprehensive image of itself as a normative power in the 
southern Mediterranean by making other security policies, as well as the non-proliferation 
policies in countries beyond the region, conform more closely to the ideal type of a normative 
power. At least some coherence appears to be necessary if the EU is to overcome the 
problems posed by the high degree of inconsistency in its security policies. Ultimately, this 
would lead to the EU being a normative power. On the other hand, the EU may wish to 
pursue a ‘double strategy’ (Pace, 2007: 671), wherein it complements its normative power 
approach to non-proliferation to the southern Mediterranean by exploiting other policy 
approaches, for example those being used in the still ongoing Syrian civil war. Given the 
urgency of the situation on the ground, a normative power approach aimed at the long-term 
diffusion of norms is currently not the most practical way to deal with Syria. But the EU 
could find alternative measures, e.g. military contingency planning in line with the US 
approach, in order to safeguard the Syrian chemical weapons arsenals, without giving up its 
normative power approach in the longer term. In this way, the EU would continue to act as a 
normative power in certain areas, e.g. policy outreach, but not limit its actions to these areas 
unnecessarily by being a normative power. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 In 2012, the original date for holding the conference, disagreement regarding the participation of Israel and 
Iran forced the Finnish hosts to postpone the conference to an undefined date in 2013. No agenda has been set 
so far. 
2 For the purposes of this article, I will refer to southern Mediterranean countries as: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Libya, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. 
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3 For an authoritative and regularly updated overview of WMD capabilities, see the country profiles on the 
Nuclear Threat Initiative website: http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/ (accessed 9 January 2013). 
4 Dual-use items and technologies can be used indistinctively for civilian and military purposes. 
5 This part synthesises the analysis of publicly available EU documents, in particular the six-monthly progress 
reports of the EU WMD Strategy, as well as interviews with European policy makers in June 2006, January 
2009 and August 2012. 
6 In the case of Israel, for example, there is no direct reference to a Middle East zone free of WMD. 
7 EU member states refused to sign the negotiated agreement in 2004 in the context of the assassination of Rafik 
Hariri, the Lebanese Prime Minister, whereas at the end of 2009 Syria was not interested anymore in signing a 
revived version of the agreement. 
8 It has been also decided to include a non-proliferation clause in any future agreement with Libya. However, 
due to the current political situation this is unlikely to happen any time soon. 
9 All currency figures mentioned in this article refer to the whole budget of programmes or projects that involve 
southern Mediterranean countries, although they usually cover countries from other regions as well. At this 
point, it is not possible to provide more concrete figures, as the EU does not publish a breakdown of the 
budgets on a country-by-country basis. 
10 Another €15m have been earmarked for the coming years. 
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Table 1. Overview of EU activities by partner country, 2003-2012* 
 
 Morocco Tunisia Algeria Libya Egypt Israel Syria Lebanon Jordan 
Host of Centre of 
Excellence 
Secretariat 
      
 
  
Target of Centre of 
Excellence project  
      
 
  
Target of outreach 
project 
      
 
  
Selected state, 
Council Decision 
2010/585/CFSP** 
      
 
  
Beneficiary, 
Joint Action 
2008/588/CFSP 
      
 
  
Recipient state, 
Joint Action 
2008/314/CFSP 
      
 
  
Recipient state, 
Joint Action 
2006/418/CFSP 
      
 
  
Recipient state, 
Joint Action 
2005/574/CFSP 
      
 
  
Non-proliferation 
provisions in 
agreements 
      
 
  
Member of 
EpiSouth Network 
         
Member of 
EuroMed Police II 
and III 
         
Target of EU 
Demarches 
         
Formal political 
dialogue partner 
      
 
  
Informal political 
dialogue partner 
      
 
  
 
Notes:  Yes 
* The table excludes regional measures, in particular workshops and seminars. It also 
excludes Council Decision 2012/166/CFSP, as the corresponding list of selected states has 
not been published yet. 
** The definitive list of recipient states has not been published yet. 
Source: Own elaboration 
